Defendant then grabbed Rignall's head and shoved his penis into Rignall's mouth, shouting: "You love it, you love it," with a tone of voice used by a drill instructor. Jeffrey was beaten, raped, and tormented in the house, and he went in and out of consciousness multiple times. Defendant asserts that the statements, in effect, directed a verdict of death and stripped the jury of its duty to weigh the evidence fairly and dispassionately decide on the proper sentence. As we have already noted, since there never was a question concerning whether defendant actually committed the 33 murders, the instruction was unnecessary, and thus there was no reason for defense counsel to tender such an instruction. These contentions were considered and rejected in People v. Davis (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 1, 34-36, and will not be reconsidered here. The People argue that the proposed instruction was improper in that it "singled out a particular item of expert testimony" contrary to People v. Speck (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 177, 196-97, and was correctly refused because it was argumentative. 115-4(e).) She also testified to an incident where defendant was coming out of anesthesia and began thrashing around with "the strength of ten men." Defendant's father tripped on a chair and fell, accused defendant of tripping him, and threatened to kill defendant. Legally, Dr. Cavanaugh explained, a person could escape responsibility only when "an extreme situation arises" where the person's ability to form an intent is questioned. Outside the presence of the jury, it was established that Dr. Eliseo had not attempted to verify any of the facts that defendant had told him, read *55 the police reports, talked to any of the people involved, or read any of the reports of the other psychologists or psychiatrists. However, we conclude that reversal is not required under the facts of this case. Defendant told him that he had some doctors that "were on his side," and that he thought he would go free. How Did. Cram refused, so defendant checked the space and appeared "shook up about it." He testified that "borderline" appeared for the first time in psychiatric nomenclature in Diagnostic Statistical Manual III (DSM III), that the diagnosis was quite controversial, and that "it is our single outstanding problem." 9-1(d); see Liptak v. Security Benefit Association (1932), 350 Ill. We agree with the People on both contentions and reject defendant's argument. Defendant next complains that the following argument was improper: While defendant argues that the insinuation that if he were sentenced to life imprisonment he would kill again was improper because it was not supported by the record, we cannot agree in light of the fact that defendant was convicted of 33 murders. We have already considered the reasoning behind immediately proceeding to a sentencing hearing, and we decline to further discuss it here. In addition, four bodies were recovered from the Des Plaines and Illinois rivers, downstream from the place where defendant had told the police that he threw the bodies. We disagree. Defendant next argues that "because of the significant mitigating evidence contained in this record, the sentence of death imposed upon John Gacy must be vacated * * *." As Rignall would later testify at Gacys murder trial, he took a few puffs before Gacy hit [him] in the face [with] a dish cloth or rag soaked in chloroform. The People did not argue that Mr. Amirante concocted the multiple-personality defect and told defendant to use it. Tag: jeffrey rignall testimony transcript. Oxygen correspondent Stephanie Gomulka contributed to this report. Defendant jumped out of the car in which they were riding and walked to their house, which was about a block away, and when she arrived home, defendant acted as if nothing had happened. Gacy was arrested, but quickly released on a minor bond. Jeffrey Rignall testified that one night when he was walking to a local bar, defendant offered him a ride. Defendant asserts that "virtually all of the expert witnesses for both sides support the proposition that defendant was acting under an `extreme mental or emotional disturbance,'" a statutory mitigating factor. Defense counsel filed an amended supplemental motion with a "proposal for venue survey" as an appendix. 1770.) Dr. A. Arthur Hartman, a clinical psychologist, was called to examine defendant by Dr. Robert Reifman, a psychiatrist, at the inception of the case due to the seriousness of the charges. In certain instances, where defense counsel asked the court to question the prospective jurors further on the insanity defense, the court did so. It is a guess." jeffrey rignall testimony transcript - neerajshah.me She stated that, one night when she could not sleep, defendant came home and was startled to find her up watching television. We agree with defendant that evidence adduced at the suppression hearing may not be used to bolster the sufficiency of the complaint for warrant. We cannot say that the argument showed professional incompetence. Amici concede that deterrence is a compelling State interest but, citing statistical studies, argue that the death penalty does not deter. Defendant's mother, Marian Gacy, testified that defendant was an unhealthy baby and was not expected to live. Moreover, considering the enormous amount of evidence establishing aggravating factors against defendant, we cannot say that these convictions, even if improper, deprived defendant of a fair sentencing hearing. Defendant complains that this procedure allowed the jurors to be exposed to media coverage of the case, and to discuss the case with their family members and friends. Defendant told Finder that he usually killed his victims for one of two reasons: because the victim demanded more money than originally agreed upon or because they posed a threat to him by exposing his sexual preferences to his neighbors. Citing People v. Willingham (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 352, 360, the People argue that they need not prove the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt, but only introduce some evidence to corroborate the defendant's *94 confession that a crime occurred. Donnelly passed out. Defense counsel also stated: "Those psychiatrists will testify that he was unable to fully and consciously control his acts, which are motivated by overwhelming and uncontrollable primitive drives." The People note that defense counsel, during opening argument, asserted that all the victims shared "certain sexual preferences." He pulled the trigger between 10 and 15 times, spinning the chamber between pulls of the trigger, until the gun finally went off. We need not address all these assertions, as we find that Dr. Garron had a sufficient factual basis for his opinion. We agree with the People that the defendant's request was, in effect, an attempt to substitute public opinion polls for *44 the process of voir dire. The Trial - John Wayne Gacy Jeffrey eventually passed away in 2000 at 49 years old. (See United States v. Haldeman (D.C. Cir.1976), 559 F.2d 31, 85.) The defense theory was that defendant was able to function well in society except when stress levels rose so high that he experienced something akin to a psychotic episode and that defendant was fit to stand trial was consistent with his defense. Defendant used a rosary to demonstrate to Officer Bettiker and the other persons in the room at the time of the confession the "rope trick" that he used to strangle his victims. but then released Donnelly near Marshall Field's, where *63 Donnelly worked. Apparently he has not seen his own children since he left Iowa. In People v. Peterson (1973), 15 Ill. App.3d 110, cited by defendant, the circuit court received information just before trial that one of the jurors had expressed her opinion that the defendant should plead guilty so that the jurors could go home. The question raised could serve only to divert the jury's attention from the issues in the case (People v. Yates (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 502, 539), and the court correctly instructed the jury to disregard the testimony and the comments. The Des Plaines police department suspected that defendant was involved in Piest's disappearance. The record shows that defendant was in continuous contact with his attorneys during the days prior to his arrest and that on the *29 night before his arrest he had told his attorneys that he was responsible for 33 murders. Sign up for our free summaries and get the latest delivered directly to you. For example, there was evidence in the record that defendant liked to "play clown" because he could grab the breasts of women in a crowd watching a parade and get away with it. (People v. Hirschberg (1951), 410 Ill. 165, 168.) He reviewed all of the medical reports on defendant. Defendant's objection to the characterization of mitigating factors as statutory guidelines was also not error here, as it fairly described the function of the statutory mitigating factors. Nothing in the record supports defendant's contention that trial counsel encouraged him to confess, but even if defendant's attorneys had done so the night before he was arrested, such a decision on their part could easily be viewed as a legitimate defense tactic. Several weeks earlier, defendant and Ried were attempting to break into a house and Ried saw defendant coming from behind him with a tire iron in his hand. Defendant admits that his argument on this point was rejected by this court in People v. Lewis (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 129, 146-47, and in People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 564, 585-87. Because Piest "became frightened" defendant worried that he might tell somebody what had happened, so he performed the "rope trick" on Piest. When asked why these "outcroppings" only occurred at night and when no one else was around, Dr. Freedman explained that these *57 hours were the hours in which boy prostitution flourished, defendant was engaged in other activities during the rest of the day, and that defendant "was, in fact, concerned with not being detected." Defendant's next objection to the circuit court's questioning of prospective jurors concerns the insanity defense. Ried got up and saw that defendant had his arm cocked back as if he were going to strike again and had a "kind of strange" look in his eyes. However, for the reasons set forth in my separate opinions in People v. Lewis (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 129, 179 (Simon, J., dissenting), and in People v. Silagy (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 147, 184 (Simon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), I believe that the Illinois death penalty statute is unconstitutional and that the death sentence should be vacated.
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